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у чоМу пРичиНи НеВдач поМаРаНчеВої РеВолюції?
У статті аналізуються причини невиконання обіцянок лідерів Помаранчевої революції щодо 
реформ в Україні. Підкреслюючи вплив стосунків у трикутнику ЄС – Україна – Росія, автор у той 
же час наголошує на первинності впливу внутрішніх чинників. 
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I. Gomza  
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION  
IN UKRAINE: THE CASE OF EUROMAIDAN
The article introduces the paradigm of contentious politics to study the Euromaidan events in Ukraine, 
describing the mechanisms of contention politics in the events of November 2013 – February 2014. Special 
attention is paid to the repertoire of contention, which remained rigid during 1991–2013, but has evolved 
after January 19, 2014 due to structural reasons.
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The political turmoil quivering Ukraine in 
November 2013 – February 2014 is defined by 
observers and participants in different ways: as a 
“protest” [2; 23], a “revolution” [5; 22], a “riot” 
[4; 6], an “insurgency” [1; 3; 10] etc. All those 
qualifications tend to be misleading, because 
application of a particular notion depends on 
political partisanship of its author. Moreover, 
conceptions like “revolution” or “insurgency” imply 
that political process they describe is highly 
abnormal. Both propensity to define the events in 
Ukraine subjectively and their perceived anomalous 
features contribute to dramatic interpretations. 
Society considers the situation in Ukraine as 
exceptional, catastrophic, and cataclysmic: there are 
numerous predictions of upcoming civil war, 
intervention, or even suggesting Ukraine to be a 
“failed state” [2].
In this article, I argue that a coherent 
comprehension of the events in Ukraine in 
November 2013 – February 2014, also known as the 
“Euromaidan”, requires introducing of a value-free 
notion. Hereafter I argue that introducing the notion 
of “contentious politics” will provide a more 
accurate explanation of the events. 
The article begins by exploring the theoretical 
foundations of the contentious politics’ paradigm. 
Secondly, preference of this paradigm in analysis 
the Euromaidan events is demonstrated. Thirdly, 
I study the repertoire of contention in Ukraine in 
historical perspective in order to explain its 
evolution in January 2014.
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Theoretical perspective
The notion of contentious politics is relatively 
new in social science. It was introduced by Ch. Tilly 
[20] and acquired scholarly attention being used by 
S. Tarrow [18], M. Lichbach [13], D. Meyer [15], 
and J. Ulfelder [24]. In early 2000s, a theoretical 
opus magnum had been published [14], where the 
paradigm of contentious politics was fully 
conceptualized.
Contentious politics is a political process 
opposite to conventional politics. The latter depends 
on particular political system and varies from free 
elections and referendums within democratic 
regimes to non-competitive elections within 
authoritarian regimes. In any case, conventional 
politics is routinized: it happens regularly and 
within institutional boundaries.
In any given society conventional politics is 
more advantageous to some social groups at the 
expense of others. Disadvantaged groups have 
fewer opportunities to influence upon political 
process: their elective franchise may be restricted as 
that of black inhabitants of SAR during the 
apartheid; they may be a minority, never able to be 
politically powerful, as Native Americans in the 
U.S.; or they may represent a popular sector not 
deserving to have any political influence according 
to official position, as in the case of the military rule 
in Brazil (1964–1985).
Once a social group perceives that it is unable to 
have impact upon the political process, it turns to 
contentious politics. Rather cumbersomely, it is 
defined as “episodic, public, collective interaction 
among makers of claims and their objects when 
(a) at least one government is a claimant, an object 
of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims 
would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one 
of the claimants” [14, р. 5]. Hereafter I use the 
notion “contentious politics” to describe collective 
actions, performed by social actors aiming to 
change the structural environment by extra-
institutional means. In other words, contentious 
politics is non-routine political participation 
transcending institutional boundaries.
Though being non-routine, contentious politics 
is nevertheless as normal as conventional politics: 
the former supplements the latter in those domains, 
where institutional modus operandi does not work. 
For example, contentious politics signalizes about 
the problems the conventional politics tends to 
ignore; it helps disadvantaged social groups to 
protect their interests; it enables the popular sector 
to influence upon élite decisions the way it is not 
able to within institutional boundaries. Figuratively, 
contentious politics is a sword of the weak, opposed 
to forms of passive resistance discussed by Scott 
[16], serving the weak as a shield.
As a form of active resistance, contentious 
politics comprehends a broad set of activities 
which vary significantly: some are non-violent 
(processions), others are more ambivalent (sit-ins 
and occupations), and there are violent activities – 
street clashes and acts of extremism. The activities 
compose a continuum with no impenetrable 
boundaries: social actors, engaged in contentious 
politics, resort to those activities which they 
believe to be the most effective. Thus, when mass-
rallies and non-violent occupations yield little 
results, actors turn to violent actions.
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly were especially 
interested in discerning some robust mechanisms of 
contentious politics – relatively common processes 
which take place despite cultural and societal 
differences. Among such recurring patterns are: 
mobilization, category formation, certification or 
decertification of actors, radicalization, and the 
diffusion of contention [14, р. 13]. Various 
mechanisms sequences lead contentious politics 
through different trajectories: for example if 
radicalization happens before the diffusion, the 
outcome will be other than in the case when the 
diffusion precedes the radicalization.
Finally, given the structural reasons for 
grievance, contentious politics is not a single 
outburst of contention. Rather, it is a sequence of 
episodes, sometimes described as “waves” [11] 
united by a common reason, though disjointed 
chronologically. The episodes cumulate in a cycle 
of contention. The relation between the cycle and 
the waves was creatively described by Gitlin as “the 
years of hope and the days of rage” [9]. A contentious 
politics’ episode is started by a trigger – a critical 
event that impels social actors to transcend the 
routine politics. Still, triggers are nothing but 
superficial incentives to act: the real reason for 
turning towards contentious politics is a structural 
problem that makes conventional politics 
unacceptable for some social groups.
From a tactical point of view, contentious 
politics has its “repertoire of contention”. The 
notion, introduced by Tilly, describes the 
“intersection of accumulated experience of social 
actors with the strategies of the authority [aiming 
to control the contention]” [19, р. 99]. The 
combination of experience, i.e. the knowledge of 
what could be done, and deterrence, i.e. the space 
for action left by the government, constitutes a 
range of means available to social actors conducting 
contentious politics.
Гомза  І. А. Політика незгоди і репертуар політики незгоди в Україні на прикладі Євромайдану  57
Repertoire of contention constantly evolves in 
two ways. Firstly, due to changes in experience and 
deterrence, some innovations are introduced. For 
example, people learn how to make Molotov 
cocktails. Secondly, due to selection of the best 
tactics made by social actors some elements are 
retained. For example, if people find out that 
fraternizing with the army helps to gain more 
sympathy, which contributes to success of 
contentious politics, they will use the same technique 
during the following episodes of the cycle of 
contention. The elements are selected according to 
their effectiveness: means making an opponent 
more compliant are likely to be used again. Thus, an 
opponents’ sensitivity to tactics of contention is an 
important feature, which determines whether a 
repertoire of contention will or will not evolve.
Analyzing combinations of innovation and 
persistence, Tilly distinguishes four repertoires of 
contention: “In the case of no repertoire, the 
previous familiarity of a performance does not 
affect the subsequent likelihood of its appearance. If 
past familiarity increases the likelihood of 
subsequent performance in a more or less linear 
manner… let us call that situation a ‘weak 
repertoire.’ If familiar performances receive strong 
preference but some unfamiliar performances also 
occur in the form of innovations, we are dealing 
with a flexible repertoire, which we can also call 
‘strong.’ If nothing but very familiar performances 
ever appear despite changing circumstances, the 
repertoire is called rigid” [21, р. 39–40].
Euromaidan as contentious politics
The social turmoil in Ukraine becomes more 
intelligible if analyzed through the contentious 
politics paradigm. The events are dramatic, but they 
are far from being catastrophic and correspond to 
general patterns of contentious politics.
The basic reason for broad social mobilization 
was the fail of political institutions to bring desirable 
results to large societal groups. There were three 
different triggers of Euromaidan, and each of them 
signalized about the fail of conventional politics. 
1) A small group of people went to the streets on 
November 21, 2013 having found out that the 
Association Agreement with the EU was not to be 
signed. Those people were disappointed by the 
Ukrainian leadership that had neglected an 
opportunity to join the European community. 
2) Much more people were driven in the streets 
by the police brutality on November 30, 2013. 
Those people were outraged by the fact that 
Ukrainian government deployed unjustifiable 
violence against a peaceful demonstration. They 
demanded to punish the officials who had abused 
the authority. Those claims were ignored by law 
enforcement agencies and the contentious politics 
persisted and involved new participants. 
3) The third trigger mobilized people concerned 
with unconstitutional enactment of bills on 
16 January 2014, which criminalized protest 
activities. The bills passed with procedural 
violations which undermined significantly the 
credibility of conventional politics. Facing the 
problem, concerned citizens tried to change the 
structural environment by extra-institutional means.
The robust mechanisms of contentious politics 
are clearly observable in the Euromaidan case. The 
cascade mobilization helped to enlarge the 
contentious politics constituency: each next trigger 
animated significantly larger social groups. That, 
what started as a demonstration in the capital, grew 
up to occupy actions all over the country. The 
diffusion of contention is also undeniable in cases of 
civic occupations of Ukrainian Regional State 
Administrations (January – February 2014) and 
popular storms of ammunition depots in some 
regions after February 18. 
Mobilized social actors have constructed a 
collective identity opposing the righteous people 
and the corrupt regime. The category formation was 
reinforced by ongoing confrontation with the police 
and reported brutalities, committed by law-
enforcement agencies like kidnapping of activists or 
torturing of prisoners. The collective action was 
represented by activists as a struggle for personal 
honor and civic liberties against the depraved 
politicians.
The mechanism of radicalization of contentious 
actions deserves the attention. Each next trigger 
modified methods of contentious collective action: 
there is an evolution from a non-violent 
demonstration after the first trigger, to barricade-
building after the second trigger, and finally to 
permanent confrontation with the police after the 
third trigger. The radicalization reached its apogee 
after the lethal police assault against the radical 
factions on February 18, which significantly 
intensified the conflict and led to armed struggle 
and casualties from both sides.
Finally, during November 2013 – February 2014 
several political actors were (de)certified. The most 
prominent case is that of the leaders of political 
opposition, V. Klychko, O. Tiahnybok and 
A. Yatseniuk. The mass rally of November 21, 2013 
was initially inaugurated as a civic initiative. Still, 
the politicians appreciated the energy of civic 
discontent and headed the contentious actions as its 
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leaders and messengers. During this period, the 
mass rallies were generally held with oppositional 
parties’ banners and the trio represented the citizens 
during negotiations with the regime. The situation 
changed significantly after January 19, 2014 when 
the trio and their instructions were ignored by more 
radical actors. From that moment V. Klychko, 
O. Tiahnybok and A. Yatseniuk were constantly 
losing their influence, being humiliated and blamed 
for inaction. Thus, they were decertified as 
mouthpiece of the contentious politics. The lost of 
credit by the oppositional trio was doubled by the 
gain of credit by a minority group “The Right 
Sector”. It grew to be a recognized political actor 
after organizing and taking responsibility for the 
violent clashes with the police. 
Repertoire of Contention in Ukraine
The events of the late February were the most 
bloody anti-government collective action since 1991. 
I argue that both the radicalization and its dramatic 
outcomes had structural reasons, namely the 
ineffectiveness of non-violent repertoire, perceived 
by contentious claimers in January 2014. A brief 
study of repertoire of contention in Ukraine during 
1991–2013 is provided to support the thesis.
Ukraine inherited its contentious collective action 
from the USSR. Being a typical “late riser within the 
[glasnost] mobilizational cycle” [8, р. 117], 
it experienced episodes of social mobilization at the 
end of 1980s. For example, on January 21, 1990 up 
to 3 million people composed a human chain 
symbolically uniting Ukraine. The society remained 
active over the year 1990, and in October a student 
hunger strike, accompanied with mass rallies at the 
Independent Square in Kyiv, compelled the 
republican parliament to discharge the ultra-
reactionary prime-minister V. Masol, to allow plural 
elections, and not to re-sign the union treaty, which 
meant that Ukraine intended to quit the Soviet 
Union. The turmoil spread over the republic in the 
year 1991: miners from the industrial eastern regions 
conducted strikes supporting the secession. Finally, 
on August 24 the republican parliament, yet again 
pushed by a mass rally, issued the Declaration of the 
Independence.
I define the period of 1990–1991 as the 1st wave 
of contention in Ukraine. During the 1st wave the 
basic elements of repertoire of contention were 
created, i.e. broad popular mobilization, mass rallies 
on central squares, non-violent demonstrations, and 
civic processions. This tactics proved to be effective 
instrument of stimulating desirable changes in 
political process.
The 2nd wave of contention surged in the early 
2000s, during the rule of the President L. Kuchma, 
who cut the powers of the legislature, put his cronies 
at the key-positions both in government and state-
machine, and introduced censorship in mass media. 
Democratic forces organized a permanent mass rally 
“Ukraine without Kuchma”, which made the society 
more sensitive towards eventual authoritarian drift. 
Kuchma’s second presidential term came to an end in 
2004, but he intended to maintain the control over the 
country by means of a successor. The role was 
prearranged for V. Yanukovych. In case of eventual 
electoral defeat, a “creative vote theft” [26, р. 134] 
was designed to assure his victory. The fraud had 
been openly used, so when the victory of Yanukovych 
was announced, concerned citizens gathered on the 
Independence Square in Kyiv. People continuously 
occupied it for a month, diversifying the contentious 
collective action by non-violent processions and 
demonstrations in front of key governmental 
buildings. Finally, the Supreme Court announced the 
result of elections to be indecisive and appointed new 
elections, lost by V. Yanukovych.
The collective action of the 2nd wave reinforced 
the repertoire of contention, constituted during the 
1st wave: once again broad mobilization, mass 
rallies, sit-ins, permanent occupations of public 
spaces and demonstrations in front of administrative 
buildings proved to be effective means of contentious 
politics. Within some 10 years non-violent forms of 
contention were effective twice. For this reason, 
when in autumn 2013 the 3rd wave of contention 
surged, the well-known methods were used by 
citizens: the most active demonstrators left their 
desks, occupied the Independence Square, and held 
the ground days and nights, while more individually 
constraint individuals joined them after labor hours. 
I identify the repertoire of contention, 
dominating in Ukraine during 1990–2013 as a 
rigid one: despite changing structural environment, 
contentious actors used familiar tactics without 
introducing significant innovations. The rigidity 
had positive and negative consequences. On the 
one hand, claimers refined their skills in rapid mass 
mobilization and exercised the contentious 
repertoire with more experience. On the other 
hand, the repertoire became rather predictable and 
ineffective. The confrontation during November-
January 2013 confirmed that the level of regime 
sensitivity to protest tactics was considerably low: 
officials ignored the contentious politics, being 
undisturbed by people in the streets. The chief 
shortcoming of the contentious repertoire was its 
invariability: claimers recurred predominantly to 
“methods of protest”, failing to effectively use 
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“methods of noncooperation” and those of “non-
violent intervention” as distinguished by G. Sharp 
[17]. Consequently, contentious actors were not 
able to combine moral, political, and economical 
pressure over the regime-élites in order to provoke 
the élite-fractioning.
Moreover, the power-holders decided to 
administer the coup de grace by increasing the level 
of deterrence. The new legislation of January 16, 
2014 introduced a vaguely defined notion of extremist 
activity; re-criminalized defamation of policemen 
and judges; criminalized blocking of administrative 
buildings; established administrative sanctions for 
moving in a column of more than 5 vehicles as well 
as for installation of tents or stages during mass rallies 
[12]. Thus, the new legislation outlawed many 
components of the repertoire of contention, 
considerably hindering the use of the rest. 
Facing ineffectiveness of the non-violent 
repertoire and the increase of deterrence level, the 
radical faction among the claimers recurred to violent 
confrontation with the police. They used the tactics 
virtually absent in contentious repertoire of mass 
protest in contemporary Ukraine, i.e. Molotov 
cocktails and self-defense units. Despite numerous 
human casualties, the innovation turned to be very 
effective: the shock of violent confrontations 
destroyed the ruling élites’ cohesion. As a result, the 
Azarov’s cabinet was dismantled; the business-élites 
overtly criticized Yanukovych, and the Party of 
Regions endured scission and member outflow. 
Finally, as a result of élite reconfiguration, the 
decisions conceived as unrealistic at the beginning of 
the 3rd wave (namely re-introduction of the 
Constitution of 2004 and discharge of  Y. Tymoshenko) 
were adopted.
Through the article I aimed to prove that 
contentious politics is by no means abnormal: it is 
used when conventional politics ceases to represent 
social interests. The 3rd wave of contention in 
Ukraine produced numerous civic initiatives and 
civic cooperation. They may be first steps towards 
building effective institutions, accountable to the 
people. The absence of such institutions was the 
reason of the cycle of contention, which animated 
contentious politics against the late Soviet regime, 
the uncompleted authoritarian regime of L. Kuchma, 
and centralized regime of V. Yanukovych. But the 
3rd wave of contention was marked by effective 
innovation of repertoire of contention – the 
introduction of violence. Given the mimetic nature 
of repertoires, the violence may resurge in cases of 
contentious politics. Thus, the regime which will 
succeed that of V. Yanukovych should make efforts 
to maximize the effectiveness and credibility of 
conventional politics.
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Гомза  І. А.
політиКа НеЗгоди і РепеРтуаР політиКи НеЗгоди  
В уКРаїНі На пРиКладі ЄВРоМайдаНу
Стаття впроваджує парадигму політики незгоди для вивчення подій, відомих під назвою 
Євромайдан. Зокрема, описано механізми політики незгоди під час подій листопада 2013 р. – лютого 
2014 р. Особливу увагу приділено репертуару політики незгоди, який відповідно до історичного 
аналізу залишався жорстким протягом 1991–2013 рр., але змінився після 16 лютого 2014 р. внаслідок 
структурних причин.
Ключові слова: незгода, протест, колективна дія, Євромайдан.
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